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1 Introduction
Economic growth is important for the development process of poor countries,
allowing them to catch up with richer economies in the world such that the
world as a whole becomes more equal in terms of income and living standards.
Early models of economic growth (see Solow, 1956, and exogenous growth theory
building on Solow’s model) indicate the role played by technological upgrading
as a primary source of sustained economic growth. While in exogenous growth
models technological change remains unexplained and acts as an external source
of economic growth, endogenous growth theory explains technological progress as
an endogenous outcome of policy decisions such as investments in human capital
formation, research and development (R&D) and knowledge-intensive industries
(see Todaro and Smith, 2015). Building on the work of Romer (1986, 1990)
and Lucas Jr. (1988), these endogenous growth models emphasize the role of
differences in country specific technology levels for explaining differences in rates
of economic growth and therefore act as a source of economic convergence or
divergence (Quah, 1997; Howitt, 2000; Kumar and Russell, 2002). Other authors
attribute moderate levels of convergence to the slow speed of technology diffusion
(see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Mankiew et al., 1992).1
Against this background, technological upgrading seems to be an important
means of developing countries to catch-up, or keep pace with industrialized coun-
tries. The importance of technology adoption and innovation for economic devel-
opment is recognized by national governments and development agencies, which
actively focus on improving and accelerating technological upgrading and innova-
tion. These institutions highlight the positive influence of technological progress
not only on economic growth but mention a big number of areas in which tech-
nological upgrading can have beneficial socio-economic effects such as increased
competitiveness, investment, efficiency, export performance, and entrepreneur-
ship, and favorable effects on poverty alleviation, sanitation, health, and nutri-
tional, energy and communication needs among others. Technological progress,
thus, acts as an important means that helps achieve the sustainable develop-
ment goals agreed upon by the member states of the United Nations (see ADB,
1The endogenous growth literature also allows for technological spillovers leading to produc-
tivity gains of one industry translating into productivity increases also in other industries (see
Romer, 1986).
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2010, 2015; Harrigan, 2007; IDB, 2015; UNCTAD, 2013; ECA, 2013, 2015; World
Bank, 2014, among others). Also governments of developing countries adopt poli-
cies targeted at technological upgrading in their agenda, like in the Perspective
Plan of Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh, 2012), in the Growth and Trans-
formation Plan in Ethiopia (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2013), in
Ghana’s Vision 2020 and Shared Growth and Development Agenda (Government
of Ghana, 1995; NDPC, 2010), in the Madagascar Action Plan (Government of
Madagascar, 2006), in South Africa’s White Paper on Science and Technology
and National Research and Development Strategy (DACST, 1996; DST, 2002),
or in the Socio-Economic Development Plan of Vietnam (Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, 2006; Socialist Republic of Vientam, 2011) for example.
Notwithstanding the importance of technological upgrading especially for de-
veloping countries in order to be able to catch-up with industrialized countries,
only a small number of rich countries account for the majority of technological
innovations. Thus, in most countries foreign sources of technology account for
the biggest part of domestic productivity growth, what makes technology diffu-
sion especially important for small and relatively poor countries (see Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Keller, 2004). There is also good news, however. The pace
of technology diffusion seems to have accelerated with globalization in recent
decades caused by lower transfer costs and an increased rate of technological
spillovers. The increased openness of developing countries through recent trade
liberalizations, their increased interconnectedness with international markets and
rising inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) lead us to hope that they can ben-
efit from technology diffusion to the same extent as was found for industrialized
nations. International trade and FDI are often mentioned as the most important
channels of technology diffusion (see for example Grossman and Helpman, 1990;
Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Xu, 2000; Keller, 2004; Tang and Koveos, 2008).
Foreign technology embodied in a country’s imports becomes implicitly available
domestically. The presence of foreign firms and multinational companies (MNCs)
in local markets increases the number of technologies available in a country as
these firms potentially have access to and use the technologies of their home
countries. Also increased interaction between local agents with international ac-
tors leads to knowledge diffusion concerning the availability of technologies and
might incentivize firms to invest in new technologies in order to serve the needs
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of foreign markets. In the light of rapidly declining trade barriers, reductions
in transport costs and larger volumes of international trade flows, together with
the higher interconnectedness of the world through rapidly expanding informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) and higher shares of FDI, technology
is supposed to be able to expand more rapidly across national boarders. This
opens opportunities especially for developing countries to more rapidly catch-up
with technologically more advanced nations by leapfrogging stages of technology
development. On the downside these opportunities are by no means automatic
but depend on the potential of developing countries to absorb the newly available
pool of technologies through increased globalization, which poses a challenge for
many developing countries (see Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Keller, 2004; Seck,
2012; ECA, 2014)
In this survey we aim to provide an overview of the diffusion of technology
and productivity with special focus on developing countries. We start by a short
discussion of how technology transfers take place. Section 3 reviews the most
influential theoretical models of technology diffusion through trade and FDI,
while section 4 discusses problems connected to the measurement of technological
upgrading and technology spillovers and summarizes some of the available proxies
for measuring technology levels. Section 5 summarizes the evidence provided by
empirical studies and discusses their implications for policy making. Section 6
concludes.
2 How technology transfer takes place
There are different channels trough which technology diffusion can take place,
which we will summarize here shortly before considering theoretical models and
empirical applications investigating their validity. Transfers of technology might
occur explicitly via licensing agreements or implicitly by the interaction of indi-
viduals from different countries that potentially have access to different technolo-
gies. They might exchange information and ideas and learn from others about
alternative technologies. Such interactions can take place via different channels
like communication, trade, and the presence of foreign companies in domestic
markets. Technology usually has two important aspects, giving it a public good
character: it is non-rival in the sense that it can be employed in different places
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at the same time, and private and public returns to investing in technology dif-
fer because it is often difficult to prevent others from its usage. This gives rise
to externalities and technological spillovers (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991;
Helpman, 1992; Keller, 2004).
Licensing agreements provide a direct form of transmission of technology to
other parties. The decision of which technology to transmit usually reflects profit
maximization behavior and it might be more beneficial for firms to transfer tech-
nologies via licensing agreements that are not the most recent ones (see Mansfield
and Romeo, 1980).2 In this survey we will focus on indirect transmission chan-
nels, however, thus discussing them in more detail while not focusing too much
on explicit transfers of technology through licensing.
Trade is often argue to be an important means of indirect technology spillovers.
Imports can act as a channel of technology diffusion to the extent that foreign
technology is embodied in imported intermediates and capital goods, which can
become domestically available or not (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rivera-
Batiz and Romer, 1991; Coe et al., 1997; Eaton and Kortum, 2002). More ad-
vanced foreign technology becomes domestically available and thereby increases
the local knowledge stock for example through reverse engineering or merely
from the use of these goods (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991). On the other
hand, imports of intermediate inputs can raise domestic productivity without
contributing to the local knowledge stock through lowering input prices if im-
ported intermediates are cheaper than if they were domestically produced. In
contrast to reverse engineering the technology embodied in imports is not au-
tomatically domestically available via this channel. Also, increased access to a
wider variety of intermediate inputs might be beneficial for increasing productiv-
ity as the available inputs can be of higher quality (see Grossman and Helpman,
1991; Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
Not only imports of intermediate goods but also exports can lead to technol-
ogy diffusion, especially to low- and middle-income countries. The interaction of
domestic firms with foreign competitors and customers who impose higher prod-
uct quality standards exporting can make them learn about the availability of
new technologies and products for example through providing technical assistance
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Keller, 2004). The increased competition on in-
2Mansfield and Romeo (1980) finds that multinational companies transfer much newer tech-
nology to their affiliates than the technology sold via licensing agreements.
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ternational markets has the potential to raise productivity by encouraging firms
to invest in new technologies and become more efficient. Indeed, the empirical
literature provides evidence that exporting firms are more productive than firms
that operate only in domestic markets. Also technological upgrading is found to
occur more quickly in firms that enter the export market than in firms that only
serve the domestic market. Exporting firms have excess to a larger market than
the domestic one and can thus realize economies of scale by increasing their pro-
duction. The resulting productivity gains of these companies induce investment
in new technologies (see Bustos, 2011).
The diffusion of technologies that are not commercially available may be en-
hanced by FDI. Usually foreign firms that locate in countries other than their
home country have access to more advanced technologies than local firms. This
makes them able to compete against domestic firms which have better knowledge
of local markets, consumer preferences, and business practices (see Blomstro¨m
and Sjo¨holm, 1999). Foreign affiliates of MNCs might adopt the same business
practices and production processes that are common in its headquarters in the
foreign country. Usually MNCs also transfer technology to their foreign affiliates
explicitly by choosing the technology level that maximizes their expected profits.
It is reasonable to assume that the degree of foreign ownership has an effect on
the technologies that are transferred to the foreign affiliate and thus also on the
degree of spillovers that can materialize. In which direction ownership patterns
affect the quality of technology that is transferred is a priori ambiguous, how-
ever. If, on the one hand, foreign firms are characterized through a high degree
of local participation, technologies might get transferred faster to domestic mar-
kets because local partners get closer contact with the foreign technology. On
the other hand, forcing MNCs into equity sharing with local partners might have
negative effects on the technologies that are transferred to the affiliates. This
can be explained by the risk of MNCs of loosing their intangible assets to the
local partner, or alternatively the bigger incentive to transfer new technologies if
the MNC is able to capture the resulting profits (see Findlay, 1978; Blomstro¨m
and Sjo¨holm, 1999). MNCs often invest in increasing the labor productivity of
local workers employed in their subsidiary by making them take part in train-
ing programs and teaching them operation processes and management methods.
This knowledge can spread to domestic firms via labor turnover with employees
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of MNCs moving to domestic companies, but also by doing business with MNCs
and observing their business practices (see Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kinda,
2012). Thus, productivity diffusion can take place in the foreign affiliate’s own
industry or through upstream and downstream linkages also in other industries.
Apart from that the entry of foreign firms can lead to increased competition in
the domestic market. This might stimulates technological upgrading, particularly
in firms that are shielded from competition at international markets and which
did not have the incentive to operate as efficiently as possible before. All these
practices, although operating via different diffusion channels, have the potential
to raise productivity in domestic firms.
An alternative channel of technology diffusion is international interconnected-
ness through improved communication and information technologies and internet
usage. Technologies that are freely available in one country can codified and made
available through books or through the internet. Information on them might also
be exchanged on conferences or over the telephone. The degree of technology
diffusion via this channel depends of course on the complexity of the technology
and its tacit or codifiable character. The more tacit know-how a certain technol-
ogy embodies, the more difficult and costly it is to transfer the technology and
it might be diffused only by face-to-face contact and training. This implies that
the stronger the tacit character of a technology, the more geographically localized
the technology will be because the cost of moving people generally increases with
distance (see Keller, 2004).
As mentioned in the introduction, technology spillovers are neither inevitable
nor automatic. While some forms of technology diffusion arise naturally because
current researchers can use the knowledge that has been created by previous re-
search over a long period of time (see Helpman, 1992; Keller, 2004), there are also
other ways of technology transfers that depend on local conditions for spillovers
to occur. For this type of technological transfer to take place countries have
to meet certain requirements to be able to make use of these new technologies.
Such prerequisites include education and skill development, what is necessary for
using new technologies like operating new machines or having the required skills
to using computer programs (see Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Findlay, 1978; Xu,
2000; Seck, 2012). If new technologies incorporate a big share of non-codifiable
tacit knowledge costly training programs for using the new technology might
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be necessary. This is especially true for more advanced products (see Wang and
Blomstro¨m, 1992; Thoenig and Verdier, 2003). For the adoption of new technolo-
gies financial resources might be requried in order to adapt thechnologies that are
invented somewhere else to local needs. Many new technologies that are invented
by technologically advanced countries might not be of use in developing countries
directly, for example due to their skill bias (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1997;
Zeira, 2007). Also the protection of property rights plays an important role in the
decision of MNCs on which technologies to transfer to their affiliates, as without
property rights protection only old technologies might get transferred (see Seck,
2012, for empirical evidence). Also it might be necessary to actively screen for
newly available technologies and to provide technical support for potential users
of new technologies for technological upgrading to take place (see ECA, 2013,
2014). All of this highlights the importance of policies that complement mea-
sures aimed at fostering technology transfers in order to increase the potential to
benefit from newly available technologies.
3 Theoretical models
3.1 Technological catch-up and convergence
In an early study, Nelson and Phelps (1966) develop a theoretical model which
endogenizes the speed of technology adoption of technologically less advanced
regions. In their model human capital and the technology level prevalent in a
society are interrelated. The authors assume an exogenously given best practice
technology level, which they define as the theoretical technology level prevalent
if all technologies spread and get adopted immediately by all economies. This
theoretical technology level is supposed to grow at an exogenous constant expo-
nential rate. The authors model technology adoption as an endogenous process
that depends on the level of human capital and the gap between the theoretical
technology level and the prevalent level of technology in a country. As a result
higher educational attainment levels speed up technological catch-up through the
adoption of new technologies. However, as the technology gap narrows, the speed
of technology adoption decreases. In steady state the level of technology adoption
equals the exogenous growth rate of the theoretical technology level. Interpreting
this model in the light of a industrialized country being the technological leader
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operating at the theoretical technology level and developing countries whose tech-
nological level is lower than the one of the industrialized country, this implies
that the speed of technology adoption could be improved and the technology gap
between developing and developed countries could be reduced by investing in
education in the developing country. Thus, policies aiming at skill upgrading are
important for technological catch-up.
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1997) endogenize the decision to adopt existing
technologies or invent new technologies by making it dependent on the costs of
learning. In their theoretical model the authors link endogenous growth mod-
els with the neoclassical growth model, and long-run growth depends on the
innovations of technologically advanced countries. While the invention of new
technologies is limited to a relatively small number of countries, most countries
adopt technologies developed by the technological leaders due to the relatively
lower cost of copying existing technologies (see also Keller, 2004). In the model
the invention of a new technology, or product, is connected to a country specific
constant fixed innovation cost. Copying an existing product that is invented in
another country is connected to a fixed cost that is an increasing function of
the number of goods that are copied. Thus, initially adopting already existing
technology is cheaper. The difference in the constant nature of the fixed cost of
innovation and imitation is that the number of products that can be invented is
infinite, while the number of products that can be copied is bound by the num-
ber of products available in the market. During the transition to steady state
the adoption of existing products is faster than the invention of new products,
thus a catch-up process occurs. However, the higher technological growth rate of
the technological less advanced region diminishes over time due to the increasing
costs of imitation. In steady state the number of products grows at the same
rate in both countries, so does production and consumption. Thus, the model by
Barro and Sala-I-Martin implies conditional convergence.3
Zeira (2007) provides a theoretical model in which not every country decides
to adopt foreign technologies. In his model the endogenous decission on to adopt
technologies depends on the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers. The
author assumes that new technology is skill-enhancing and allows to substitute
less skilled workers in the production process by a smaller number of skilled
3The authors acknowledge that government policies, infrastructure, tax rates, property
rights, and the rule of law are subsumed in the technology parameter in their theoretical model.
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workers. The new technology is adopted only if the productivity gains by the
new technology outweigh the relatively higher costs that arise due to the higher
wages of skilled labor in comparison to unskilled labor which was used under
the old technology. This implies that countries with a relatively high wage ratio
between skilled and unskilled labor are less likely to adopt new technologies than
countries with a lower wage ratio. This usually applies to countries that are
relatively abundant in unskilled labor, which is commonly the case in developing
economies. Thus, Zeira’s model implies that developing countries have limited
capacities for technological catch-up due to technologies that are not suited to
local needs because of their skill-complementary nature.
3.2 Channels of technology diffusion
The above mentioned literature does not model the channel through which tech-
nology transfers take place explicitly, a issue that we will look at in this section.
An early contribution by Findlay (1978) argues that the presence of multinational
corporations in a technologically less advanced economy facilitates technology
diffusion. Motivated by the lack of explicit analytical models of technological dif-
fusion at the time the paper was written,4 Findlay develops a dynamic model of
how technology diffusion takes place. He explicitly includes the role of FDI in his
model. In the model technological progress in the advanced region is exogenously
defined, while technological progress in the less advanced region is endogenously
determined as a function of the technology levels in both regions and the presence
of foreign firms in the local economy. The influence of foreign firms in the less
advanced region is proxied by the ratio of the foreign to the domestic capital
stock. It is assumed that the bigger the foreign capital stock in the economy is,
the faster the new technology is diffused. Higher profits realized by the affiliates
of MNCs as a result of technological upgrading lead to a rise in tax payments,
which finally accrue to domestic firms increasing their capital stock and inducing
technological catch-up. If technological upgrading is faster in the less advanced
region, the foreign sector’s profit rate and thus its capital growth rate will fall.
This decrease in foreign profits impacts also on the domestic capital stock via its
effect on tax revenues that also decline. The long-run steady state is reached when
both, the rates of technological progress and the the rates of capital accumula-
4The author mentions Mansfield (1961) and Nelson (1968) as two notable exceptions.
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tion coincide in the domestic and the foreign sector. It indicates the equilibrium
level of technological disparities between the regions and dependence of the less
advanced region on foreign capital stock.
The implication of this model is that the less advanced region will never reach
the technology level of the technological leader but rather approach an equilibrium
gap. This gap can be influenced according to Findlay (1978), however, by an
educated labor force, management quality, and other parameters such as market
structure, patent laws, and licensing arrangements and royalties. The author also
analyses potential scenarios and their impact on the technology gap and foreign
capital dependence. He finds that the faster the growth rate of technology in the
advanced region, the larger the technology gap and the higher the dependence
on foreign capital in the less advanced region. The more favorable opposite
can be achieved by increasing the educational level in the less advanced region.
According to the model a rise in the tax rate on foreign profits has a similar effect
on technological efficiency and foreign capital dependence as a rising propensity to
save in the less advanced region—both lead to a reduction of the share of foreign
capital in the less advanced region but a larger technological gap. Alternatively,
the author argues that it would be possible to allow for a higher savings rate to
lead to a higher capability of technology adoption, which would further reduce
foreign capital dependence while offsetting the unfavorable effect on technological
efficiency. Finally, Findlay acknowledges that although the presented model relies
on the assumption that the inflow of foreign capital into a technologically less
advanced economy leads to technological spillovers, one could alternatively argue
that technological upgrading is reinforced in self-reliant economies.
While Findlay’s (1978) model implicitly assumes that foreign affiliates of
MNCs operate with the same higher technology level like their headquarters,
Wang and Blomstro¨m (1992) endogenize the process of technology transfer from
multinational companies (MNCs) to their affiliates in the host country, and from
these to domestic firms, in a game theoretical model. In contrast to earlier stud-
ies, the authors allow the competition of domestic firms to affect the rate at
which MNCs transfer technology via FDI. In their model R&D aimed at creating
new technologies takes place only in the headquarters of the MNC in the foreign
country. The transfer of technology to the MNCs affiliate, which is already estab-
lished in the host country, incurs a transfer cost. The authors incorporate the age
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of transferred technology in their model by assuming that the cost of technology
transfer decrease with the transfer frequency, what makes it cheaper to transfer
old technologies. The demand for investment in technology is derived from the
profit maximizing behavior of firms, taking into account that more advanced tech-
nology makes the differentiated product of a firm more attractive for consumers.
The domestic firm chooses its learning investment to maximize the present value
of profits. The foreign affiliate takes into account the decision of the domestic
firm when maximizing its own profits, leading to a joint determination of tech-
nology investment of both firms.5 For the domestic firm the learning investment
is also an increasing function of the technological proximity. Departing from a
relatively large initial technology gap, the investment of domestic companies in
learning leads to a technological catch-up process. As reaction to the catch-up of
the domestic firm the foreign affiliate raises its investment in technology transfers
in order to keep its market share.
The model suggests that the rate of technology transfers of MNCs to their
affiliates could be increased by improving the learning efforts of domestic firms
to upgrade their technology. If this occurs, foreign affiliates will face higher
competition from domestic firms and invest more in technology adoption them-
selves. Furthermore, learning efficiency and the amount of resources devoted to
learning positively impact on the speed of technology transfers. Higher learn-
ing investment makes catch-up with more advanced countries more likely. In a
short extension of the model for a market with more than two firms Wang and
Blomstro¨m (1992) allow for positive externalities of learning. In the presence of
externalities the equilibrium learning investment of domestic firms is lower than
the social optimum. This stresses the need for policies aimed at coordinating
learning investment in order to speed up technology transfers via FDI. As tech-
nological upgrading leads to an improvement of the products produced by both
types of firms while holding the firms profit streams constant, the authors argue
that policies leading to faster technology transfer could be welfare enhancing if
the benefits outweigh the costs connected to the implementation of such policies.
5In order to account for the potentially better access of foreign firms to international capital
market, and to allow for a risk premium of the foreign firm to operate in the domestic market,
discount rates of future profits of the foreign and domestic firm are allowed to differ. Lower
discount rates are connected to higher investment in technology adoption (and thus faster
technological upgrading) and depend negatively on the operation risk of the foreign firm in the
domestic market and positively on better access to international capital markets.
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Finally, Wang and Blomstro¨m (1992) do not preclude the possibility of catch-up
of the less advanced region, which happens as technological imitation of domestic
firms occurs at a faster rate than technology creation through R&D by the MNC
headquarters.
Trade can also act as a channel of technology diffusion. It is often argued that
trade in intermediate goods leads to productivity improvements through the lower
price of foreign intermediates in the production of final goods. Helpman (1992)
provides an overview of theoretical models on technology diffusion through in-
termediate inputs, while Grossman and Helpman (1991) discuss the role of trade
as a channel of technology diffusion in these models in more detail. The mod-
els are build on a Solow growth model and allow for intermediate inputs in the
production function. In the absence of technological progress growth can only
be sustained by an sufficiently high marginal product of capital, which in certain
situations is, however, not a sufficient condition for long-run growth. Allowing for
technological progress in the model either exogenously, or endogenously by mak-
ing it dependent on capital accumulation, does lead to sustained long-run growth.
Technological progress can be introduced by allowing for horizontal or vertical
product differentiation through the availability of different product varieties. In
the model of horizontal product differentiation investment in R&D leads to the
development of additional varieties of inputs. The more intermediate inputs are
available to an economy, the more efficient it can use available factor inputs to
produce output. Vertical differentiation, in contrast, takes into account different
qualities of products. Here, R&D spending aims at improving product quality,
which increases total factor productivity. Alternatively, R&D might increase pro-
duction efficiency also through a reduction of production costs. With increasing
experience in R&D (and thus an increasing knowledge capital stock) the produc-
tivity enhancing effect of R&D rises. R&D is conducted by using skilled labor,
which is no longer available to the production of final goods. The decision to
innovate is endogenous and depends on the economy’s resource base, the degree
of market power and time preferences.
What happens if countries open up to trade? Let us consider the case with-
out international knowledge spillovers first. As mentioned above, R&D activities
compete with the manufacturing sector for human capital. Trade liberalization
leads to a contraction of the sector that produces the good that uses the economy’s
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relatively scarce factor intensively, as this good can be imported to a lower price.
This implies that skill-intensive sectors in a relatively unskilled-labor abundant
country contract, and wages of skilled workers decrease according to the Stopler
Samuelson theorem. At the same time, this leads to a decrease in the cost of
R&D, which uses skilled workers whose wage is now lower and thus spurs innova-
tion. The opposite is true for economies that are net-exporters of the good that
uses human capital intensively. Now, what happens if we account for technology
spillovers? Technology might spread across boarders in the presence of interna-
tional trade because of interaction with foreign customers or alternatively because
intermediate imports provide access to foreign technology adding to the domestic
stock of knowledge. Technology diffusion is assumed to increase with the degree
of interaction between the two economies and thus with trade volumes. Unless
there are no technology spillovers, the model suggests that an increase in trade
flows leads to a higher transfer rate of technologies from abroad, thus raising
domestic productivity and accelerating economic growth.
To sum up, in innovation-based growth theories trade has the potential to
facilitate the transmission of technological knowledge across international board-
ers, leading to an increase in a country’s total factor productivity and spurring
innovation. This effect can be even stronger if trade leads to falling wages of
skilled workers, which are employed in the R&D sector. However, through its ef-
fect on factor markets trade might also have the opposite effect by drawing away
human capital from research activities in cases in which a country exports goods
intensive in skilled-labor (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991). For developing
countries, which are usually exporters of goods with lower skill-intensity, the first
effect seems to be the prevalent one. Thus the theories presented in Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Helpman (1992) point toward productivity enhancing
effects of international trade liberalization in these countries.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) focus on imports as a diffusion channel of for-
eign technology and incorporate geographic distance in their model. The au-
thors depart from the Dornbusch et al. (1977) Ricardian model of international
trade, which they append with differences in technology between countries that
are separated by geographic barriers. A country’s efficiency level is drawn as a
random parameter from a country-specific probability distribution. With trade,
consumers have access to the goods sold by producers in different countries to
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different prices, where the price of a good depends on the technology level, input
costs, and trade barriers. Foreign technology is accessed through the purchase of
cheaper foreign goods and trade augments the production possibilities of a coun-
try in this way. Through specialization output can be produced more efficiently
by purchasing cheaper foreign inputs. A counterfactual analysis conducted by
Eaton and Kortum suggests that technological progress is spread via trade, lead-
ing to welfare improvements in all countries if labor is mobile between sectors.
With immobile labor lower wages induced by shifting production patterns might
lead to a negative income effect, thus leading to a lower overall welfare effect.
The authors conclude that spillovers of foreign technological upgrading on do-
mestic productivity can be potentially high between geographically close countries
(or countries with low bilateral trade barriers), and countries with flexible labor
markets which allow labor to reallocate to other sectors of production.
3.3 Trade induced technical change
Apart from the role of trade as transmission channel of technology, trade can
also stimulate technology creation. In his paper Wood (1995) explains that trade
is likely to contribute to technological progress per se. He argues that trade
liberalization leads to higher competition on world markets, which is especially
severe in import competing industries. Industrialized countries that are usually
abundant in skilled labor relative to developing countries where the opposite
applies, have the incentive to invest in new (unskilled-labor saving) technologies
in order to stay competitive, a development that Wood calls defensive innovation.
Thoenig and Verdier (2003) formalize the process described by Wood (1995)
in a theoretical model and allow trade to influence the factor bias of innovation.
Thoenig and Verdier argue that globalization might not only increase competi-
tion but might also make it possible for foreign forms to copy more advanced
technology from domestic firms, causing a thread of technological leapfrogging.
Thus, in order to reduce the extent of potential technological spillovers to firms
in other countries, domestic firms have the incentive to invest in new technologies
that are more difficult to copy. These newly invented technologies are likely to
embody a big share of tacit knowledge in order to avoid technology spillovers
to others because non-codifiable technologies are harder to transfer. These less
imitable technologies are usually more skill-intensive than older technologies that
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are subject to being replicated by others. The authors show that it does not
depend on who industrialized countries trade with in order to have the incen-
tive to invest in new skill-biased technologies, as their results similarly apply to
North-North and North-South trade.
Apart from the before mentioned mechanisms of trade impacting on technol-
ogy creation, trade might also lead to an increase in average productivity of a
sector as increased competition drives out less productive firms. This idea is for-
malized by Melitz (2003) who introduces firm heterogeneity into a international
trade model. Entry into the market is connected to incurring a fixed cost. Only
firms which are more productive than a productivity threshold stay in the mar-
ket. After trade liberalization every firm can enter the export market conditional
on paying an additional fixed cost and incurring an iceberg transport cost. Thus,
only the most productive firms choose to export. Exporting firms also expand
their production and hire away labor from other firms with lower productivity
levels. In the open economy expected profits for potential entrants in the market
are larger, due to the possibility to export. This leads to the entry of more firms
with more heterogeneous productivity levels. As now there are also potentially
more firms with relatively higher productivity levels in the market, the thresh-
old for staying and producing in the domestic market rises. As a result average
productivity increases.
While in the Melitz (2003) model productivity gains occur independent of in-
vestment in new technologies, Bustos (2011) appends the model of heterogeneous
firms with international trade to incorporate technological upgrading. Like in
the Melitz model only the most productive firms enter the export market. Also,
it is only the most productive firms that invest into new technologies, which is
connected to a fixed cost, because the benefits of technological upgrading are
proportional to revenues. Thus, the model implies that trade liberalization leads
to technological upgrading that is induced by the rising revenues of exporting
firms after opening up the economy.
These examples make clear that trade does not only have an important role
as a transfer mechanism of technology but also as a means of spurring innovation.
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4 Measurement of technological upgrading and
spillovers
Popular proxies for measuring technology are R&D expenditure, the use of patents,
or productivity, all of which are connected to advantages and disadvantages. R&D
expenditure is widely used as proxy for measuring technology, due to the avail-
ability of internationally comparable data for a relatively long time period. Data
on R&D are for example available from the OECD for a wide range of countries
starting in 1981 (OECD, 2014a, 2015a), and from the World Development Indi-
cators database of the World Bank (World Bank, 2015), starting in 1996. Figure
1 and 2 depict some of the available data from the two databases for the most
recent year available per country.
Figure 1: Research and development indicators
Source: OECD, 2015. Available from www.oecd.org/sti/rds
As can be seen in the figures industrialized countries account for the biggest
part of R&D expenditure as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP),
while R&D expenditures in developing countries are quite low. There is also a
strong positive relation between R&D expenditures and researchers employed, as
shown in figure 1. As only a small number of countries account for the largest
R&D expenditures, whereas small and relatively poor countries rely relatively
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Figure 2: Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)
(1.14891,4.30688]
(.61464,1.14891]
(.32544,.61464]
(.12863,.32544]
[.01854,.12863]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
heavily on the use of foreign technologies the justification for using R&D expen-
diture as proxy for technology in developing countries is limited. Technologically
less advanced regions primarily invest in imitation and technology adoption rather
than technological innovation (see Helpman, 1992; Keller, 2004). The OECD def-
inition, which is usually applied to R&D measurement, comprises only resources
spent on increasing the stock of knowledge and innovation and not on technology
adoption (see OECD, 2002). Another drawback of using R&D data as a proxy of
technology levels is its flow nature, while technology levels are usually related to
stock data. Data on R&D expenditure do not take into account previous R&D
spending of a country and might be very volatile between years. Thus, many
researchers use the perpetual inventory method to calculate R&D capital stocks
as a proxy for technology levels. Over time we see an increase in the growth rate
of R&D expenditures in developing countries, like indicated in figure 3, which
might eventually indicate a catch-up process of these countries. As the main
R&D statistics from the OECD are measured at a geographic basis and do not
reflect ownership patterns, this development might, however, be connected with
the increase in FDI and research conducted in affiliates of MNCs (see Keller,
2004; UNCTAD, 2014).
Another proxy that is commonly used for technology is patent data. Patents
give the holder “a temporary legal monopoly to use an innovation in a specific
market at the price of public disclosure of technical information in the patent
description” (Keller, 2004). In general the use of patent data as a proxy of tech-
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Figure 3: Growth rate of research and development expenditure (% of GDP)
(.454158,1.313738]
(.17624,.454158]
(.0206685,.17624]
(-.1374924,.0206685]
[-.5632545,-.1374924]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2001 and 2010.
nology levels is more adecuate in the case of developing countries, as they usually
have a substantial number of patents. Data on patents are for example available
from the OECD patent databases (OECD, 2015b), the European Patent Office’s
(EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) (European Patent
Office, 2013) and the WDI database (World Bank, 2015). For some countries
patent data goes even back more than 150 years (see Keller, 2004). Figure 4 dis-
plays the number of patent applications by residents in countries for which data
is available from the WDI database. As can be seen in the figure, also developing
countries make use of patents quite extensively (as compared to R&D expendi-
tures) with an exception of countries in Africa and the Middle East and some
countries in Latin America. Figure 5 shows the growth rate of patent applica-
tions between 2000 and 2010, also providing some evidence that the application
for patents has been growing more strongly in some developing as compared to
developed countries.
The use of patent data as a proxy for technology levels is problematic as well
because not every patent has the same impact on a country’s technology stock.
Indeed, the biggest part of the value of patents is accounted for by a small number
of patents. Thus, simply counting the number of patent applications might be
misleading (Keller, 2004). As an answer to that problem, citation-weighted patent
data have been used by some authors (see for example Bloom and Van Reenen,
2002; Aghion et al., 2005; Hashmi, 2013). A problem that is more difficult to
address is that technology is not always patented, be it based on a firm’s decision
or the impossibility to codify technology due to its tacit character.
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Figure 4: Patent applications, residents
(1061,135762]
(157,1061]
(34,157]
(4,34]
[1,4]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
Figure 5: Growth rate of patent applications, residents
(1.163993,10.56261]
(.3323627,1.163993]
(.0633021,.3323627]
(-.2112069,.0633021]
[-.8703704,-.2112069]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2000 and 2010.
Also an outcome of the usage of technology, namely productivity, is commonly
used by empirical studies. Some of them measure productivity as labor produc-
tivity, which is defined as output per worker (and available on a country level for
example from OECD, 2014b), while others use total factor productivity (TFP)
that is obtained by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function in which out-
put is related to inputs of production. Because TFP is usually measured as a
“residual”, that is output that cannot be explained by physical inputs, it might
be subject to measurement error as it potentially captures additional factors such
as institutions, infrastructure, and other things that are not included in the esti-
mation. Often even data on physical quantities of output and inputs might not
be available leading researchers to use data on revenues and expenditures instead.
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This might, however, lead to the wrong interpretation of higher mark-ups as an
increase in productivity (see Keller, 2004). In order to get rid of the influence
of time-invariant institutions in the measurement of TFP, many authors use first
differences in order to construct TFP changes which they use instead of TFP
levels. Using such method does not get rid, however, of time-variant factors that
contaminate TFP estimates. Sometimes TFP measures are therefore used to-
gether with data on R&D in order to decrease the likelihood of inappropriately
measuring changes in technology (Keller, 2004).
Figure 6: Total factor productivity level at current PPPs
(.925563,3.406989]
(.7108181,.925563]
(.5415916,.7108181]
(.329443,.5415916]
[.1323831,.329443]
No data
Source: Penn World Table 8.0. Most recent year available.
TFP can be calculated based on sector-level or more aggregated data, but is
also available on a national level from the Penn World Table (PWT, Feenstra et
al., 2013) for example. Figure 6 depicts the data for all countries in the world
for which data is available from the PWT. The pattern that emerges from this
picture is similar to the one obtained when looking at R&D expenditure or patent
applications—developing countries seem to have lower levels of productivity than
technologically more advanced nations. When looking at growth rates in TFP
in figure 7, however, developing countries do not seem to have experienced a
stronger growth rate of productivity as compared to industrialized nations. The
evidence for catch-up based on TFP measures seems to be limited.
There exist attempts to decompose productivity measures into several com-
ponents, including technological change and technological catch-up. The study
by Kumar and Russell (2002) is an example that analyses the distribution of
labor-productivity across countries. The authors investigate the driving factors
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Figure 7: Growth rate of TFP level at current PPPs
(.8474212,1.806126]
(.6852351,.8474212]
(.5481424,.6852351]
(.3327438,.5481424]
[.0876426,.3327438]
No data
Source: Penn World Table 8.0. Growth rate between 1990 and 2010.
of shifts in the distribution over time. For this, the authors decompose national
labor-productivity growth for 57 countries in the 1965–1990 period into three
components: technological changes, technological catch-up and capital accumu-
lation. With non-parametric techniques the authors estimate a global production
frontier by data envelopment techniques, which represents the state-of-the-art
technology level available at a certain point in time to the world. The relative
efficiency level of each country is then expressed by the distance to the technol-
ogy frontier. Some countries operate at this efficient technology level, which can
potentially be transferred as well to other countries with lower technology levels.
Over time, technological improvements and innovation shifts the state-of-the-art
technology level, resulting in shifts in the technology frontier. Also, some coun-
tries are closer to the frontier than others, and over time their position relative
to the frontier can change. The move toward the technology frontier represents
technological catch-up, which reduces technical and allocative inefficiencies. Fi-
nally, the degree of capital accumulation can change over time, leading countries
to improve their capital-labor ratios which is represented by movements along
the technology frontier. A mayor advantage of the non-parametric estimation
technique used by the authors in comparison to earlier decomposition analyses is
that it does not require any functional form, and does not assume a particular
market structure or market imperfections. Thus, it is also more flexible in that
it allows technological change to be non-neutral.
The analysis of Kumar and Russell (2002) reveals that on average countries
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Figure 8: Percentage changes between 1965 and 1990 in output per worker
Source: Figure 4 in Kumar and Russell (2002). Note: Percentage changes between 1965 and
1990 in output per worker and three decomposition indexes plotted against 1965 output per
worker. Each panel contains a generalized least squares (GLS) regression line.
have moved toward the global production frontier, indicating that there was sub-
stantial technological catch-up between 1965 and 1990. Their results however
show that this catch-up did not especially benefit poor countries, as rich and
poor countries seem to have equally benefited from technology transfer (see panel
(b) in figure 8). The authors find that although technological change has posi-
tively contributed to growth in most countries in their sample, the benefits from
technological change were very unevenly distributed with technological regress in
some countries with very low capital-labor ratios and very pronounced techno-
logical progress in relatively rich countries (see panel (c)). Thus, technological
change decidedly non-neutral in this sense, what indicates that earlier contri-
butions which assume neutral technological change might have led to erroneous
results. Capital accumulation turns out to have been the main contributor to
increased labor productivity, accounting for on average three quarters of overall
productivity gains and therefore seems to be the main driver of observed growth
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patterns (see panel (d)).6
Alternative measure that can be used as proxies for technology include charges
from the use of intellectual property rights, trademark applications, high technol-
ogy exports as a percentage of manufactured exports, and the number of scientific
and technical journal articles, all available from the WDI database (World Bank,
2015, see figures 9 to 12).7
Figure 9: Charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts (% of GDP)
(.0056597,.6138089]
(.0010452,.0056597]
(.0003417,.0010452]
(.0000791,.0003417]
[4.12e-07,.0000791]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) pro-
vides, among others, statistics on the proportion of businesses using computers
and the internet (UNCTAD, 2015). The country coverage of these indicators is
limited, however, as is visible in figures 13 and 14.
Also the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank, 2015) include indi-
cators related to technology, such as for example the percentage of firms using
e-mail to interact with clients and suppliers or the percentage of firms having
their own website (see figures 15 and 16). These indicators are however usually
not available in panel format but are reported only for some points in time.
6The authors acknowledge that the finding of the big influence of capital deepening for ob-
served growth patterns can potentially be attributed to them measuring capital deepening by
using capital-labor ratios, while other authors that rely on capital-output ratios find a lower
influence of capital deepening on economic growth. Growth driven by technological progress
could lead to a rising capital-labor ratio—thus the effect of technological progress would be at-
tributed to capital deepening—while the capital-output measure would remain constant. Thus,
the analysis presented by the authors potentially underestimates the importance of technolog-
ical progress for labor productivity and growth.
7Figures showing the growth rates of the variables showed in figures 9 to 12 can be found
in the appendix.
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Figure 10: Trademark applications, total
(9716,259924]
(3776,9716]
(1546,3776]
(460,1546]
[6,460]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
Figure 11: High technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
(14.80673,87.40443]
(5.45266,14.80673]
(2.475574,5.45266]
(.5714718,2.475574]
[0,.5714718]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
Some studies also use the data on investment in computers and other machin-
ery and technical equipment, or ICT capital goods in order to proxy for tech-
nology levels (see Haskel and Slaughter, 2002; Conte and Vivarelli, 2011). Such
information is available for example from the OECD (OECD, 2014b, 2015a).
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Figure 12: Scientific and technical journal articles
(1043,209272.3]
(105.5,1043]
(17.1,105.5]
(2.7,17.1]
[0,2.7]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Most recent year available.
Figure 13: Proportion of businesses using computers
(98.660004,100]
(96.68,98.660004]
(91.940002,96.68]
(75.559998,91.940002]
[18.35,75.559998]
No data
Source: UNCTADstat. Most recent year available.
Figure 14: Proportion of businesses using the internet
(96.120003,100]
(94.510002,96.120003]
(86.650002,94.510002]
(50,86.650002]
[10.15,50]
No data
Source: UNCTADstat. Most recent year available.
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Figure 15: Percent of firms using e-mail to interact with clients and suppliers
(880.5,1000]
(801,880.5]
(634,801]
(448.5,634]
[132,448.5]
No data
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Most recent year available
Figure 16: Percent of firms having their own website
(570,910]
(430,570]
(308,430]
(192,308]
[18,192]
No data
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Most recent year available
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Against the background of the above mentioned problems connected to the
measurement of technology levels it is evident that the measurement of technology
spillovers is even more challenging. While technology transfers can be measured
using data on copyrights, patents and licenses, data on the externalities of tech-
nology such as technology spillovers do not exist (see Keller, 2004). Empirical
studies intend to identify technology spillovers often by estimating R&D spillover
regressions, in which TFP (or another proxy of technology) is regressed on a for-
eign R&D variable. The foreign R&D stock is often weighted by import shares of
a country with its trading partners or by other weights that aim to capture the
channel of technology transfer (see for example Coe and Helpman, 1995; Lichten-
berg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998; Keller, 1998; Tang and Koveos,
2008). Alternatively to basing the evidence of technology spillovers on foreign
R&D, also other measures of foreign activity, such as FDI, can be used (see for
example Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm, 1999; Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Waldkirch and Ofosu, 2010; Kinda, 2012). Empirical studies that
aim to analyze the extent of such spillovers have to be careful, however in identify-
ing causal effects rather than mere correlations (Keller, 2004). We will summarize
some of these studies in what follows. Doing so we concentrate on econometric
studies that focus on developing countries or provide important insights in the
topic.8
5 Empirical evidence
5.1 Foreign direct investment
Haddad and Harrison (1993) investigate the impact of FDI on productivity in
the manufacturing sector in Morocco for the 1985–1989 period. Using panel data
on individual firms the authors are able to control for firm-specific characteristics
such as firm size and to account for the endogeneity emerging from the potential
selection of foreign firms into more productive sectors of production. In order to
empirically evaluate technology spillovers of foreign to domestic firms, the authors
follow two identification strategies: one focuses on productivity levels, while the
other one looks at productivity growth. For the first strategy the authors estimate
8A summary table including the studies under investigation can be found in the appendix.
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an equation of the form
uijt = α + β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt + β3SIZEijt + ijt (1)
where uijt is the deviation of productivity of the firm i from the sector’s j best-
practice productivity frontier in year t, and FDI firmijt and FDI sectorjt are
the proportion of a firm’s foreign assets in total assets and the share of foreign
firms in the sector, and SIZEijt stands for firm size measured as a firm’s sales
relative to sales of the largest firm in the sector. The results based on equation (1)
suggest that foreign ownership and firm size are connected to higher productivity
levels. There is also evidence for a higher productivity level of firms in sectors
that are characterized by a higher share of foreign firms. The authors interpret
this finding as greater competition through the presence of foreign firms in a
sector that leads firms with low productivity levels leave the market.
Turning to productivity growth, the authors specify their empirical model as
dln(Yijt) =β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt
+ β4dln(Lijt) + β5dln(Kijt) + γ1Dt + γ2Ij + ijt
(2)
where d stands for first differences, ln(Yijt) is the natural logarithm of the value
added of firm i in sector j and time t, Dt and Ij are a set of sector and time
dummies, ln(Lijt) and ln(Kijt) are the logarithm of labor and capital respectively.
The results of the estimation of equation (2) indicate that the coefficients of
both FDI measures are statistically insignificant (and negative), thus providing
no evidence for the existence of higher productivity growth in foreign firms or
spillovers of productivity growth to firms operating in sectors characterized by a
high share of foreign firms. The authors argue that the results could be driven by
different technology gaps between domestic and foreign owned firms and include a
variable measuring this gap at the beginning of the sample among their regressors.
While the above mentioned results on the previously included variables do not
change qualitatively, the technology gap variable turns out to be positive and
statistically significant in sectors characterized by high import protection. Thus,
the productivity of domestic firms that are operative in protected sectors seem to
grow faster when there is a large productivity gap to foreign firms. This catch-up
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is, however, not driven by the presence of foreign firms in the sector.
Haddad and Harrison (1993) estimate a big number of additional specifications
to check the robustness of their results and conclude that the found patterns are
not affected by variations in trade protection and other factors. They conclude
that in Morocco joint ventures benefited from FDI, while the efficiency increase
of domestic firms attributable to FDI was a one-time phenomenon. Moroccan
firms seem to have not benefited from FDI in terms of rising productivity in the
second half of the 1980s.
Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999) focus on the case of Indonesia. They investi-
gate whether Indonesian firms realize productivity gains induced by technology
transfer and spillovers from foreign firms using firm-level data from 1991. In
contrast to Haddad and Harrison the authors rely on data for one year, which
impedes them to take into account the impact of time-invariant firm characteris-
tics. Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm focus on the ownership pattern of foreign firms in
more detail, investigating whether different productivity effects are observed for
firms that are or are not majority foreign owned (majority ownership is defined
as foreign ownership higher than 50%, while minority ownership is defined as
foreign ownership equal or up to 50%). The hypothesis that the authors want
to test is whether a higher share of foreign ownership leads to newer technology
being transferred and thus higher productivity levels of majority owned foreign
companies. Concerning productivity spillovers induced through the presence of
foreign companies in a sector the authors expect to observe larger productivity
spillovers in sectors characterized by a large presence of minority owned foreign
firms in contrast to majority owned foreign firms, because local partners might
capture new technologies faster when they work with foreign technologies.
In their empirical setup the authors first investigate whether foreign companies
are more or less productive than their domestic counterparts by estimating
Yij
Lij
=α + β1FDI firmij + β2
Kij
Lij
+ β3skillij + β4capacityij + β5scaleij + γIj + ij
(3)
where, as before, Yij represents value added of firm i in sector j, Lij and Kij
stand for labor and capital stock, skillij is measured as the ratio of white to blue
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collar workers, capacityij is the share of actual to potential output as reported in
the dataset, scaleij is the firm’s output relative to average output in the indus-
try, and Ij is a set of industry dummies. Here, FDI firmij is a dummy variable
equal to one if an establishment is partly foreign owned. This indicator is sub-
stituted by two dummy variables measuring minority (≤ 50%) and majority (>
50%) foreign ownership in an alternative specification. The results of the authors
suggest that the capital-labor ratio, skill level, capacity utilization, and scale of
operation are positively related to labor productivity. Furthermore, foreign firms
(either majority or minority owned) are more productive than their domestic
counterparts.
In the second part of their analysis Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999) investigate
whether FDI spillovers to domestic firms, indicated by the superscript d, are
present in Indonesia by estimating
Y dij
Ldij
=α + β1FDI sectorj + β2
Kdij
Ldij
+ β3skill
d
ij + β4capacity
d
ij + β5scale
d
ij + γIj + ij
(4)
where FDI sectorj stands for the share of output produced in foreign firms at
the 5-digit industry level. This variable is replaced in an alternative specification
by two variables measuring the share of industry output produced by majority
and minority owned firms respectively. The results of estimation of equation (4)
provide evidence for productivity spillovers in sectors that are characterized by
a high value-added share of foreign firms. There are no statistically significant
differences in the effect of the presence of minority and majority owned firms in
a sector. The results for the other variables that enter the specification remain
the same as before. The results suggest that domestic firms benefit from the
presence of foreign firms in a sector in terms of increased labor productivity,
while the degree of foreign ownership does not play a role for the strength of
productivity spillovers.
Finally, Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999) investigate whether the results are
driven by increased competition through the entry of foreign firms in domestic
markets, which enhance the labor productivity of domestic firms. By doing so
the authors split their sample in exporting and non-exporting firms arguing that
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exporters are already exposed to foreign competition at world markets, while non-
exporters might experience an increase in competition and are forced to increase
their productivity. Indeed, the results of this analysis suggest that productivity
spillovers are restricted to the non-exporter sample, giving support for increased
competition driving the results of increased labor productivity.9
The authors conclude that the degree of foreign ownership of firms does not
have a significant effect on FDI spillovers in Indonesia. They argue that policies
that aim to restrict foreign ownership and force MNCs into joint venture agree-
ments seem not to have a productivity-enhancing effect on Indonesian firms.
Turning to the case of Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) test the hypoth-
esis that inward FDI encourages technology spillovers from foreign to domestic
firms. The rich data from the Encuestra Indisturial allows them to track a large
number of firms during the 1976 to 1989 period. As each plant can be observed
over time, Aitken and Harrison (1999) are able to account for potential endogene-
ity emerging from non-random selection of firms into sectors. Their results are
based on the estimation of a log-linear production function at the firm level by
ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors,
which is specified as
ln(Yijt) =α + β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt
+ β3FDI firmijt ∗ FDI sectorjt
+ β4ln(Xijt) + γ1Dt + γ2Ij + ijt
(5)
ln(Yijt) is the natural logarithm of output of firm i in sector j and time t,
FDI firmijt is the share of foreign ownership at the plant level, FDI sectorjt
is the average of foreign ownership at the industry level, and Xijt is a vector
of plant level inputs including skilled and unskilled labor, materials and capital.
Dt and Ij are year and industry dummies and ijt is a random error term. The
authors also estimate variations of equation (5) by weighted least squares (WLS)
estimations with employment weights, and by first (and longer) differencing in
order to account for firm fixed-effects. Furthermore, they estimate specifications
omitting the industry dummies or adding variables measuring local productivity
9Exporters might already have access to improved technology through the trade-channel as
explained above.
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spillovers of FDI, and conduct estimations based on subsamples of different firm
sizes.
While Aitken and Harrison (1999) find positive effects of FDI on own plant
production, their results do not support the hypothesis that FDI leads to pro-
ductivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. Indeed, these spillovers turn
out to be even negative. The authors attribute this finding to a market steal-
ing effect that emerges as higher productivity foreign firms expand and make
domestic firms cut their production. Because domestic firms as a result cannot
make use of scale economies their productivity declines. However, the authors
find some weaker evidence for positive productivity spillovers of FDI to other
firms with foreign equity participation. Repeating their estimations for different
subsamples based on firm size Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that the results
are especially robust for small firms with less than 50 employees, while for larger
firms the results depend to a large degree on the specification used.
The results based on first and longer difference transformations of the data
strongly confirm the negative productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic
firms, while productivity spillovers to other foreign plants are statistically less
often significant and own plant effects turn insignificant in each specification.
The authors interpret these findings as indication for the preference of foreign
investors to invest in the most productive firms a priori. Not accounting for firm-
level fixed effects would wrongly attribute this behavior to own-plant productivity
effects of FDI. Also, these results suggest that foreign firms benefit from FDI in
sectors with a already high FDI share. Aitken and Harrison find little evidence
for locally concentrated productivity spillovers to domestic firms. However, their
results indicate that although at the country level foreign firms benefit from FDI,
the opposite is true for geographically close foreign firms, pointing towards a
market stealing effect also in this context.
Finally, Aitken and Harrison (1999) also evaluate the overall impact of FDI
on productivity at the sectoral level. They use the coefficient estimates of their
regressions together with the data to determine the net effect of FDI for each
firm. The net effect at the country level is obtained by summing over all firms
applying weights that are proportional to the firms output level. This analysis
shows that the net impact of FDI on productivity at the country level is quite
small and its sign depends on the model specification used.
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Although many previous authors—like Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999) for In-
donesia, found evidence for productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms
arising from FDI inflows—Aitken and Harrison (1999) provide evidence that in
Venezuela the opposite is true. The authors argue that many previous studies, es-
pecially cross-country studies, fail to account for the potentially higher investment
inflows into sectors with already high productivity levels and therefore mistakenly
attribute the higher productivity to capital inflows in these industries. Omitting
industry dummies in their regressions, Aitken and Harrison obtain findings sim-
ilar to those of former cross-country studies, what points towards endogeneity
problems in previous research.
In an empirical study on Ghana, Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) investigate
whether there are positive productivity spillovers of FDI on both domestic and
foreign firms in the manufacturing sector in the 1991–1997 period. They also
look at the effect of FDI on domestic wages. Furthermore, the authors test the
hypothesis that although foreign presence might lead to a decline in productivity
levels of domestic firms in the short run due to required investments in machin-
ery, tools, and training programs in order to be able to realize the benefits from
new technologies, this effect might be offset in the longer run when gains from
using new technologies materialize (see also Liu, 2008). Making use of the panel
structure of firm-level data from surveys of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector,
in their empirical model the authors take into account both observable as well
as unobservable firm characteristics in order to avoid spurious results that are
subject omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues. The authors base their es-
timations on measures of total factor productivity, labor productivity and wages,
which they subsequently use as dependent variable in their analysis.
The empirical strategy of the authors consists in subsequently estimating the
equations
ln(TFPijt) =α + β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt
+ β3FDI firmijt ∗ FDI sectorjt
+ β4SLijt + γ1Dt + γ2Ii/j + ijt
(6)
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ln(TFPijt) =α + β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt
+ β3FDI sectorjt ∗ time+ β4time
+ β5SLijt + γ1Dt + γ2Ii/j + ijt
(7)
ln(LPijt) =α + β1FDI firmijt + β2FDI sectorjt
+ β3FDI firmijt ∗ FDI sectorjt + β4ln(klijt) + β5ln(kijt)
+ β6SLijt + γ1Dt + γ2Ii/j + ijt
(8)
where ln(TFPijt) is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity of firm i
in sector j and time t, FDI firmijt represents the foreign ownership share of
the firm, FDI sectorjt is defined as the output-share-weighted average of foreign
ownership in a sector, SLijt is the share of non-production workers (excluding
apprentices and technical workers), Dt and Ii/j are a set of time and respectively
firm or sector dummies, and ijt is the error term. In equation (7) time stands for a
time trend, which is introduced to test the hypothesis of falling labor-productivity
in the short-run and its interaction term with FDI sectorijt should capture the
potentially positive long-run effect on productivity. In equation (8), ln(TFPijt)
is substituted by ln(LPijt), which is the natural logarithm of labor productivity
(defined by value added per worker) and the logarithm of the capital-labor ratio
ln(klijt) and of capital itself ln(kijt) are included in the specification.
In order to calculate total factor productivity from a production function of
the form Yit = AitK
α1
it L
α2
it to estimate equation (6), where Yit is value added,
Ait total factor productivity and Kit and Lit stand for capital and labor, the
authors follow three distinct approaches in order to test for the robustness of their
results. The authors estimate the production function by OLS and system GMM
(generalized method of moments) (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and
Bond, 1998) and introduce an investment function in an alternative specification
of the production function using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology
to take into account the potential simultaneity between variable inputs and TFP.
The results of estimations of equations (6) to (8) suggest that foreign owner-
ship has a statistically significant positive effect on TFPuctivity of foreign firms
especially in sectors that are characterized by a high presence of foreign firms. In
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contrast, in sectors with a very low presence of foreign firms the effect of foreign
ownership on TFP of foreign firms with minority foreign ownership is negative
but the statistically significance depends on the model specifications. Domestic
firms, in contrast, are always negatively affected by a high share of foreign firms
in the same industry. Like in Aitken and Harrison (1999) this result might be
explained by negative competition effects as foreign firms crowd out domestic
firms by reducing their scale and productivity. This cannot be outweighed by
potential positive technology effects. Estimations for a subsample of domestic
firms and the results for labor-productivity as dependent variable as in equation
(8) reinforce this result. Also, the evidence for positive long-run effects of FDI
on domestic firms’ productivity from equation (7) is limited. While the short-run
effect of FDI is a statistically significant decrease in domestic firms’ productivity,
the positive long-run effects are either statistically insignificant, or so small that
it would take at least 10 years before the negative short-run effects are offset.
Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) also investigate the effect of FDI on wages in
foreign and domestic firms under the hypothesis that foreign firms potentially
pay higher wages based on their higher marginal product of labor, while wages
paid by domestic firms might contract as a result of increased competition or an
on average lower ability level of workers in domestic firms after more able workers
are contracted by foreign companies. In order to test whether this is the case
in Ghana, the authors estimate an equation similar to equation (8), where they
substitute labor productivity by the natural logarithm of wages per worker as
dependent variable. The results of this analysis suggest that FDI does not have
a statistically significant impact on wages paid by neither foreign nor domestic
firms. The authors attribute this finding to rigid labor markets in Ghana, which
preclude wage effects stemming from the presence of foreign companies in the
domestic market.
The authors conclude that empirical studies focusing on the same question in
different countries have resulted in very distinct findings concerning the effects
of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms. They point out that results found
for one country should not be extrapolated to another country, as country char-
acteristics such as the technology gap between the origin and the host country
of FDI, intellectual property rights enforcement, the level of competition in the
market, as well as economic size are important determinants of the occurrence
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of productivity spillovers. They emphasize that especially Sub-Saharan Africa is
quite distinct from many Asian and Latin American countries in terms of trade
and investment policies (see also Asiedu, 2002).
A cross-country study by Xu (2000) distinguishes between the technology
diffusion effect and other productivity-enhancing effects of the presence of U.S.
MNCs in a panel of 20 developing and 20 developed countries for the 1966–1994
period. The author uses data on technology transfers to the MNCs’ affiliates,
which he measures by the royalty and license fee payments of the MNCs’ affili-
ates to their parents as a share of their value added. Under the assumption that
higher spending on this kind of technology transfers leads to a bigger degree of
technology diffusion to the host country of the affiliate, the author is able to sepa-
rate the effect of technology transfers from other productivity enhancing effects of
the presence of MNCs such as productivity and efficiency gains through increased
competition. In an empirical specification the author regresses the growth rate
of TFP on the technology gap measured as the ratio of a country’s TFP to the
TFP of the US, on education measured as the average years of male secondary
school attainment, and consecutively on the value added of the MNCs’ affiliates
as a share of the GDP of the host country, the spending on technology transfers
of MNCs’ affiliates as a share of their value added, and the share of technology
transfer spending of MNC affiliates in the host country’s GDP. Each estimation
includes country and time fixed effects. The author takes into account potential
endogeneities of the MNC measures by instrumenting the value added share of
GDP by MNCs’ affiliates and the technology transfer spending of MNC affiliates
as a share of their value added. The author finds a statistically significant posi-
tive coefficient of each of the three MNC variables in the full sample, indicating
that there are productivity and technology gains associated with the presence of
MNCs’ affiliates. Splitting the sample and repeating the same estimations for
developing and developed countries separately, the author finds evidence for a
productivity increase due to the presence of MNCs in both groups, while the
effect of technology transfer (measured as share of value added or host coun-
try’s GDP) turns out to be statistically significant only in the sample of OECD
countries. The author interprets this finding as evidence for technology diffu-
sion taking place only in developed countries, which he explains by the higher
level of human capital in this group of countries as compared to developing coun-
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tries. He concludes that especially in developing countries human capital plays
an important role in attracting technology from MNCs.
Another cross-country study by Kinda (2012) investigates the presence of
vertical productivity spillovers via backward linkages using information on the
share of a company’s sales to MNCs in the country, employing firm level data for
Brazil, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, and Vietnam in the mid 2000 period.
The author uses one-step stochastic frontier analysis, accounting for the effect
of the investment climate faced by domestic and foreign firms. In her model
the production function, the determinants of firm inefficiency, and an error term
consisting of a technological inefficiency part and a random external shock, are
estimated simultaneously (see Kinda, 2012). The one-step stochastic frontier
model can be written as
ln(Ycijt) = ln(f(Lcijt, Kcijt, Dt, Ic, Ij, β)) + Vcijt − Ucijt
where Ucijt = Z
′
cjiδ + ηcijt
(9)
where ln(Ycijt) stands for the natural logarithm of the value added of firm i in
sector j and country c at time t, Lcijt and Kcijt stand for capital stock and
labor, Dt, Ic, and Ij are a set of time, country, and industry dummies, β is the
coefficient vector, Vcijt is the part of the error capturing composite shocks, and
U measures technical inefficiency. Ucijt can be expressed as a function of the
investment climate and firm specific characteristics, which are summarized in the
vector Zcij. ηcijt is a random error term.
The results provide evidence that firm productivity is strongly influenced by
investment climate constraints, which are lower for foreign firms. This is because
in contrast to local firms, foreign firms seem to use their capacity to influence
their own investment climate via for example generating their own electricity
using power generating units, or by their decision to locate in areas with more
favorable investment climate. The only factor that turns out to undermine the
productivity of foreign firms is the time they have to spend in dealing with gov-
ernment regulations because their knowledge of local markets in comparison to
domestic firms is limited.
In order to investigate to what degree vertical productivity spillovers to do-
mestic firms are present in the countries under investigation, Kinda (2012) uses
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information on the share of a firm’s sales to MNCs located in the respective coun-
try. This allows him to identify spillovers through backward linkages. The results
of Kinda’s analysis indicate higher productivity levels of (especially small) local
firms that sell a higher share of their production to MNCs. The author mentions
various explanations for this finding for which formal tests are not possible due
to data constraints. The diffusion of higher technology to domestic suppliers of
MNCs is one potential explanation of the results. Alternatively, the demand from
MNCs could increase competition among local suppliers, which leads to improve-
ment in efficiency while driving the least productive firms out of the market. The
author acknowledges that her results could also be affected by endogeneity bias as
foreign firms could choose the most productive domestic firms as their suppliers.
In this respect the results on spillovers to local firms via backward linkages are
inconclusive and further investigation is needed.
Given the very heterogeneous findings on whether the presence of MNCs affect
domestic firms’ productivity, Go¨rg and Strobl (2001) conduct a meta analysis in
order to find out whether differences in study design drive the results. Their anal-
ysis covers 21 papers focusing on both on developing and on developed countries
for different time periods. Both cross-section and panel data studies are included
in their analysis, which are using either industry or firm level data. Furthermore,
the included papers differ in their definition of the foreign presence variable used
(employment share, output share, or other) and the dependent variable (output
per worker, growth of output, or other). Go¨rg and Strobl (2001) perform a for-
mal test on whether either of these differences could be responsible for driving
the heterogeneity of findings in the various studies. Additional to controlling for
the above mentioned differences, the authors also include a measure for sample
size (the square root of the degrees of freedom) among their variables. Go¨rg and
Strobl provide evidence that the results of cross-sectional studies usually point
towards a significantly higher (positive) effect of foreign presence on domestic
firms productivity, in contrast to panel-data studies that usually find insignifi-
cant or even negative productivity spillovers. The same explanation applies to
the different findings of the studies on developing countries that we summarized
above. The authors attribute this result to time invariant firm or sector specific
characteristics that cannot be controlled for in cross-section studies in contrast
to panel data studies, a point also mentioned by Aitken and Harrison (1999).
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If foreign firms are attracted by sectors with high productivity, the coefficient
of the presence of MNCs on domestic firms productivity would be positive and
mistakenly overstated (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Go¨rg and Strobl, 2001).
Go¨rg and Strobl do not find any of the other controls having an impact on the
results of the underlying studies, thus not providing evidence for the hypothesis
of Haddad and Harrison (1993), Kokko et al. (1996), and Xu (2000) that positive
technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms might not be present in de-
veloping countries due to their lower level of human capital and lower absorptive
capacity as the technology gap between domestic and foreign firms is potentially
bigger. Finally, Go¨rg and Strobl (2001) point out that the empirical literature in
this field might be subject to publication bias and studies that find insignificant
effects of MNCs on domestic firms’ productivity might not be published.
Summing up, there exist very limited evidence that FDI has a positive (and
statistically significant) effect on the productivity of local firms in developing
countries. Studies that find evidence for positive spillovers usually rely on cross-
sectional datasets which impede them to take into account endogeneity due to
the decision of foreign firms to locate in sectors that have a higher productivity
level on average. Against this background, the question emerges whether ex-
pensive national investment promotion policies that are aimed at attracting FDI
inflows—such as fiscal or financial incentives like for example investment grants or
subsidized credits—are justified. Often, such policies are criticized for being eco-
nomically inefficient and for leading to misallocations of public funds (UNCTAD,
2014). A study by Haskel et al. (2007) attempts to quantify the productivity
gains of domestic firms through FDI in the U.K. and relates these gains to the
cost of government incentives granted to attract FDI. The authors use plant level
data covering the manufacturing sector in the 1973–1992 period and account for
endogeneity and selection bias in their production function estimates. Haskel
et al. find evidence for positive productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic
firms, which are typically small, however. Their results indicate that a 10 per-
centage point increase in foreign presence in an industry raises domestic plants’
productivity by about 0.5 percent. This suggests an additional annual £2,440 (in
2000 prices) generated by one additional foreign job. The authors conclude that
this is much less than per-job incentives granted by the government to attract
FDI and therefore question the effectiveness of such government incentives.
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Especially in the light of negative effects of FDI on domestic firms’ productiv-
ity that are sometimes found in the literature (like found by Aitken and Harrison,
1999, for Venezuela or Waldkirch and Ofosu, 2010, for Ghana), also investment
incentives that are not costly for the government like for example investment
liberalization or simplified business registration might not be beneficial if indeed
there is a market stealing effect of foreign firms. Although foreign firms may ex-
perience productivity increases, these benefits might not accrue to the domestic
economy. As a reaction to potentially unfavorable effects of FDI on the domestic
economy some countries introduce new FDI restrictions like Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
or India for example (see UNCTAD, 2014). However, although the presence of
foreign firms might not have positive impacts on the productivity of domestic
firms, the presence of MNCs might still have other beneficial affects for develop-
ing countries’ domestic economies as they might create additional employment
opportunities or because foreign firms might pay higher wages or provide better
labor standards. Also these factors should be taken into account when evaluating
the implications of FDI on welfare.
5.2 Trade
In this section we focus on the role of international trade as a channel for tech-
nology diffusion. In an influential study, Coe and Helpman (1995) investigate the
existence of international R&D spillovers embodied in international trade flows
for a sample of 21 OECD countries and Israel in the 1971–1990 period.10 The
authors depart from theoretical models of innovation-driven endogenous growth,
which we summarized in section 3, in which expenditures on R&D lead to ei-
ther an increase in the number of available inputs in the production function
(horizontal differentiation) or inputs of higher quality (vertical differentiation),
both of which increase productivity (see Helpman, 1992; Grossman and Helpman,
1991). Taking into account the extent of globalization reflected by the large ob-
served trade volumes, the authors account for the possibility of using inputs for
production that are produced by an economy’s trade partners. Their hypothe-
sis is that imports of goods and services embody technological knowledge of the
exporter that is directly related to its R&D capital stock, what might enhance
10Although the authors do not focus on developing countries we summarize the paper because
it has been indicatory for a whole strand of following research.
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domestic productivity. The authors measure productivity as the natural loga-
rithm of TFP, which they regress on the domestic R&D capital stock and the
import-share weighted average R&D stock of a country’s trading partners. The
empirical specification that Coe and Helpman (1995) estimate is the following:
ln(TFPit) = α
0
i + α
dln(Sdit) + α
f ln(Sfit) + it (10)
where ln(TFPit) is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity (in local
currency units) in country i and year t, Sdit is the domestic R&D capital stock (in
constant U.S. dollars), and Sfit is the import-share weighted foreign capital stock,
which takes the form
Sfit =
∑
j 6=i
mijt
mit
Sdjt (11)
mij measures imports of country i from country j, and mi are the total imports
of country i. Thus, a country potentially benefits more from foreign R&D if it
imports more from countries with a relatively high R&D stock. In order to take
into account that TFP is measured in local currency units, while data on R&D
is measured in constant U.S. dollars, the authors transform their data into index
numbers, what leads to the absorption of the denominators that are used to index
country specific R&D stocks in the country fixed effects αi (see Lichtenberg and
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998). A version of equation (10) that takes into
account also the volumes of trade flows and not just their relative importance is
ln(TFPit) = α
0
i + α
dln(Sdit) + α
fmit
yit
ln(Sfit) + it (12)
where the import-share weighted foreign capital stock is scaled by the share of
imports as a proportion of GDP (yit). Coe and Helpman allow the coefficient
of domestic R&D expenditure to be different for the the seven largest economies
(G7) from the coefficient estimate for the rest of the countries in the sample.11
Their results suggest that domestic R&D is an important driver of domestic
productivity. This effect turns out to be more pronounced in G7 countries, for
which the elasticity of productivity with respect to domestic R&D is higher than
compared to the rest of the sample. Furthermore, the authors find international
11The authors take into account the cointegration relationship between total factor produc-
tivity and domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks which they use in their empirical analysis.
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R&D spillovers to be important contributors to domestic productivity. While
in G7 countries domestic R&D seems to affect TFP more strongly than foreign
R&D, the reverse is true for small countries which are in general more open
to international trade and can therefore profit more from international R&D
spillovers. The impact of foreign R&D is stronger the more open the economy of
a country is to international trade.12
Coe et al. (1997) performs a similar analysis to that in Coe and Helpman
(1995), expanding their sample to include 77 developing countries in the 1971–
1990 period in order to investigate whether developing countries are equally able
to benefit from international R&D spillovers like their industrialized counterparts.
The authors slightly modify their estimation equation, taking into account the
diversity of the countries in their sample in terms of human capital and the fact
that these countries virtually do not invest significant proportions of their income
in R&D. Their model takes the form
dln(TFPit) = α
0
i + α
f
i dln(S
f
it) + α
m
i dMit + α
e
idEit + α
ttime+ it (13)
d stands for first differences, ln(TFPit) is the natural logarithm of total factor
productivity in country i and year t, Sfit is the import-share weighted foreign R&D
capital stock, which is based on import shares of machinery and equipment from
industrial countries, Mit is the share of machinery and equipment imports from
the 22 industrial countries in the sample, Eit is a measure for eduction, proxied
by secondary school enrollment, time is a time trend and it is the error term. In
this specification the coefficients αi are allowed to differ between countries. The
authors also allow for an interaction of Mit and Eit with S
f
it in an alternative
specification.
The results of the the authors suggest that there exist positive spillovers of
foreign R&D on domestic TFP in developing countries, and that imports of ma-
chinery and equipment reinforce this effect.13 Although the share of secondary
12Coe and Helpman (1995) also calculate a measure of the rate of return on investment in
R&D by using information on the ratio of output to R&D capital stocks and on the elasticities
of TFP with respect to R&D estimated before. The results of this analysis suggest that the
rate of return on R&D capital is very high.
13For very low levels of import-share weighted foreign R&D capital stocks imports of ma-
chinery and equipment turn out to have a negative effect on TFP.
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school enrollment has a positive effect on domestic TFP, it seems not to affect
the degree of R&D spillovers. Because developing countries usually do not in-
vest significant proportions of their income in R&D as compared to industrialized
countries, the spillover effects of foreign R&D are particularly important for them.
Coe et al. (1997) conclude that R&D spillovers from the North to the South are
also of quantitative importance.
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998) re-examine the em-
pirical model of Coe and Helpman (1995) and point out some methodological
problems connected to it. They show that the weighting scheme used by the
authors to compute foreign R&D capital stocks in their empirical estimation is
influenced by the level of data aggregation used and suggest an alternative weight-
ing scheme for foreign R&D, which takes into account the intensity as well as the
direction of international R&D spillovers. It is defined as
Sf−altit =
∑
j
mijt
yjt
Sdjt (14)
The authors also improve upon the estimation framework of Coe and Helpman
(1995) by noting that the transformation of variables into index numbers leads to
a misspecification of equation (12). They re-estimate the same specification using
levels instead of index numbers. Finally, Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (1998) emphasizes that the equations estimated by Coe and Helpman
(1995) can be written as a special case of the more flexible form
ln(TFPit) = α
0
i + α
dln(Sdit) + α
f
[
mit
yit
]θ1
ln
[∑
j
mijtS
d
jt
mθ2it y
θ3
jt
]
+ it (15)
for which θ1, θ2, and θ3 are parameters that can take the values of 0, 1, or some
other value. Based on this equation the authors show that the share of imports
from a country to its GDP, like in equation (14), is a more appropriate weight
than the share of imports from a country to total imports of the recipient country,
as in equation (11). Furthermore, when taking into account the erroneous use of
indexes by Coe and Helpman (1995) the finding that countries that are more open
to international trade benefit more from foreign R&D spillovers than countries
that trade less turns statistically insignificant. By adding the import share and
its interaction with foreign R&D among the regressors, the results indicate that
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increased openness reduces TFP unless the foreign R&D capital stock is very
large. This indicates that the country of origin of imports rather than import
volumes alone drives the domestic productivity enhancing effect of foreign R&D.
Keller (1998) also revisits the analysis in Coe and Helpman (1995) in order to
assess whether the international R&D spillovers found by Coe and Helpman are
driven by international trade patterns. The authors perform a Monte-Carlo based
analysis that generates randomly matched trade partners in order to compare
the results of these random trade patterns with the results using actual trade
patterns that are observed in reality. The motivation of Keller (1998) is that if the
estimates based on the exposure to foreign R&D measured by randomly created
trade links are similar or even outperform the estimates based on real trade
patterns, this would cast doubt on the claim that trade patterns are important
in driving R&D spillovers.
Keller (1998) substitutes the import measures mijt in the construction of the
import-share weighted foreign R&D capital stock in equation (11) with randomly
created values. He also treats mit in the estimation of equation (12) similar.
Keller’s results indicate that also these randomly created import flows give rise
to positive spillovers of foreign R&D. They even outperform the ones based on
actual trade flows—they are often larger and explain more of the cross-country
variation in TFP. In a second exercise Keller (1998) abstracts from trade flows
completely by substituting the import-share weighted foreign R&D capital stock
in equation (11) by a unweighted sum of foreign R&D capital stocks.
Sf−uwit =
∑
j 6=i
Sdjt (16)
In this setting R&D spillovers on TFP do not depend on trade patterns at all. The
results based on this specification indicate positive international R&D spillovers
that are larger than the ones found by Coe and Helpman (1995) and explain more
of national TFP. Thus, the results of the analyses conducted by Keller (1998) cast
serious doubt on the importance of a country’s import composition for impacting
its productivity via R&D spillovers.
The author points out that his results seem unsurprising in the light of the
data aggregation and data quality, the uncertainty connected to the data gen-
erating process and the complicated nature of the problem. He concludes by
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highlighting that factors that are unrelated to trade might be important for ex-
plaining international technology diffusion.
Trade might, however, still be an important channel for technology diffusion.
The analysis of Keller (1998) is incomplete in the sense that it does not take
into account the interconnectedness of the world trading system and indirect
spillovers of R&D embodied in imports via third countries, which should ideally
also be included in the investigation. Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005) account for such
indirect spillovers of foreign R&D through third countries using the same dataset
as Coe and Helpman (1995) and appending it by trade flows of 92 additional
countries. The authors decompose foreign R&D that is imported into a direct
component as in Coe and Helpman (1995) and an indirect component that arises
from indirect imports via third countries. For their estimation the authors use
the same specification as Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (1998) (equation
(10)) where Sf can stand alternatively for the definition of Coe and Helpman (see
equation (11)), the definition of Keller (see equation (14)) or the import weighted
sum of foreign R&D available in each trading partner (see Lumenga-Neso et al.,
2005) where
Sf−total = Sf + Sf−indirect (17)
and
Sf−indirect =
[
(I + ρM)−1 − I − ρM]Sd (18)
Sf is defined as in equation (11), Sd is the domestic R&D capital stock, and
Sf−indirect accounts for indirect trade-related R&D spillovers. I is the identity
matrix, and M is the matrix of bilateral import shares.
The result of the authors suggest that indirect R&D spillovers are much larger
than the direct ones used by Coe and Helpman (1995). There is evidence that
trade acts as an important transmission channel of technology, once indirect
spillovers through third countries are taken into account. The result found by
Keller (1998) is likely to arise because bilateral trade patterns do not account for
the much larger indirect R&D content that is embodied in the total foreign R&D
capital stock. The authors conclude that trade volumes are more important than
trade patterns for technology transmissions.
Focusing on developing countries, Conte and Vivarelli (2011) investigate the
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existence of imported skill-biased technological change for a group of 23 develop-
ing countries over the 1980–1991 period. The authors apply a more direct measure
of technology transfer via imports than previous studies. Their technology trans-
fer indicator measures the value of imports of capital goods from high-income
countries that are likely to incorporate advanced technologies. The authors de-
fine those products as industrial machinery and equipment, power-generating
machinery, electrical machinery and apparatus, and ICT capital goods such as
office machines, automatic data-processing equipment, and telecommunication
apparatus (TLC). The hypothesis of the authors is that technology imports are
skill enhancing and thus should lead to widening skill-based employment differ-
entials in the countries of their sample. Conte and Vivarelli base their empirical
analysis on the first-order profit-maximization condition for labor obtained from
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. Their empiri-
cal model, which they estimate in a system GMM framework (see Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) takes the form
ln(Lcjt) =α + β1ln(Lcjt−1) + β2ln(Ycjt) + β3ln(wLcjt)
+ β4ln(Kcjt) + β5ln(TIcjt) + γ1Dt + γ2Ic/j + cjt
(19)
where ln(Lcjt) stands consecutively for the natural logarithm of blue and white
collar workers in sector j in country c and year t, ln(Ycjt) represents the loga-
rithm of value added, ln(wLcjt) is consecutively the wage of blue and white collar
workers, ln(Kcjt) measures capital deepening as the ratio of gross fixed capital
formation to value added, ln(TIcjt) stands for technological import deepening
which is defined as the ratio of technology imports to value added. Dt and Ic/j
are set of time dummies and successively country and sector dummies, and cjt
is the random error term.
Their results indicate that the deepening of technology imports significantly
raises the demand for white-collar workers, while it has no statistically significant
effect on the number of blue-collar workers. The authors interpret this result as
being in line with the intuition that technology imports are skill-enhancing and
thus impact on the skill-bias of employment.
The effect of international telephone traffic as transmission channel of foreign
R&D is investigated by Tang and Koveos (2008). The authors adopt a similar
50
approach to the one of Coe and Helpman (1995) by estimating a variant of equa-
tion (10) in which they add an interaction term of the domestic R&D variable
with a dummy variable for OECD countries, a measure for openness and a human
capital measure among the explanatory variables. Their study comprises of 22
OECD and 21 developing countries in the 1983–1997 period. The authors subse-
quently use three different weighting methods for the stock of foreign R&D. One
is based on equation (11) in Coe and Helpman (1995), while the other two sub-
stitute import shares by the inward FDI shares from G7 countries in total inward
FDI from G7 countries and the share of a country’s outgoing telephone traffic to
G7 countries in total outgoing telephone traffic to G7 countries. In an alternative
specification the authors subsequently include two of the three measures together
in their estimations. The results indicate that technology diffusion, especially via
trade and international telephone traffic have significant positive impacts on total
factor productivity, while the effects of FDI as transmission channel are smaller
in size. The spillover effects for trade and telephone traffic are higher in develop-
ing countries, while there does not exist a significant different effect for FDI as
transmission channel.
The results of Tang and Koveos (2008) have to be interpreted with caution.
The authors modify the weights for measuring the influence of the foreign R&D
capital stock on domestic TFP and draw conclusions from this analysis. However,
Keller (1998) showed that the weighting based on trade patterns used by Coe and
Helpman (1995) does not play any particular role in measuring the extent of R&D
spillovers and derives an even better fit of the observed productivity patterns by
randomly generated weights. Thus, the results of Tang and Koveos (2008) could
be influenced in a similar way and should be interpreted against this background.
The authors do not account for indirect trade linkages as in Lumenga-Neso et al.
(2005). Also, apart from their last model in which they look at two transmission
channels at the same time, their estimates might be driven by omitted variable
bias—the transmission channel modeled is likely to pick up the effect of other
transmission channels, given the relatively high correlation between the three
alternative transmission measures the authors use. Although it is an interesting
research question whether FDI and telephone traffic act as transmission channels
of foreign technology, the results of Tang and Koveos are inconclusive due to the
problems connected to their estimation framework.
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Another study that looks not only on imports but also on FDI as transmission
channel for technology diffusion is the one by Seck (2012). The author focuses
on a panel of 55 developing countries from 1980–2006 and identifies factors that
enhance the capacity to absorb new technologies. The empirical specificication
is build upon the model by Coe and Helpman (1995), appending it by allowing
for R&D spillovers through FDI and adding controls for human capital and in-
stitutional quality and their interactions with the foreign R&D variables among
the regressors. The specificiation is defined as
ln(TFPit) =α
0 + αmln(Smit ) + α
fdiln(Sfdiit ) + α
eEit
+ αmz(Zitln(S
m
it )) + α
fdiz(Zitln(S
fdi
it )) + α
zZit + α
tDt + it
(20)
where ln(TFPit) stands for the natural logarithm of TFP in country i and year
t, Smit is the import-share weighted foreign capital stock based on imports of
machinery and equipment (following Coe et al., 1997), and Sfdiit is the foreign
capital stock that is FDI-share weighted. Eit measures human capital as the
average years of schooling, Zit captures institutional quality (as the ease of doing
buisness, property rights protection, and origins of legal systems), Dt is a set of
time dummies and it is the error term. S
m
it is constructed like S
f
it in equation
(11), and Sfdiit is similarly defined as
Sfdiit =
∑
j 6=i
FDIijt
Iijt
Sdjt (21)
FDIijt is inward FDI from country j to country i in year t, Iijt is total physical
investment and Sdjt is the domestic R&D capital stock of country j.
Seck finds evidence for substantial positive spillovers from import-share weighted
foreign R&D and positive but smaller spillovers from FDI-share weighted foreign
knowledge. The degree of spillovers is found to increase with the level of hu-
man capital and the quality of institutions, as mesaured by the ease of doing
business, intellectual property rights protection, and in legel systems originating
from British law. Spillovers from the import-share weighted foreign capital stock
are substantially bigger than the ones found by Coe et al. (1997), accounting for a
two percent increase in domestic FDI due to a ten percent increase in the foreign
capital stock. These North-South spillovers to developing countries are, however,
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still quantitatively lower than spillovers found by trade between industrialized
nations.
The estimates reveal beneficial effects of not only trade openness but also
openness to FDI of a country. This partially contradicts recent evidence of some-
times even negative effects of the presence of foreign firms on domestic produc-
tivity like found some of the studies summarized above. The contradiction in
findings potentially stems from the fact that in Seck’s empirical model FDI acts
as a transmission channel for the foreign R&D capital stock, while the studies
cited in section 5.1 do not directly account for the degree of technological knowl-
edge of the origin country of foreign firms. While in Seck’s model only spillovers
from inward FDI from the G7 countries are taken into account, this is usually
not the case in studies that relate the presence of foreign owned firms to domestic
productivity levels. In contrast to Tang and Koveos (2008) who also found that
FDI has a conducive effect on domestic productivity Seck includes both transmis-
sion channels simultaneously in the model specificiation in order to avoid omitted
variable bias. The results of spillovers via imports potentially do not account for
the entire spillover effects of foreign knowledge, however, because they do not
take into account indirect spillovers through imports, such as in Lumenga-Neso
et al. (2005).
The evidence that emerges from studies that focus on the effect of imports
as a transmission channel of foreign technolgy points toward a positive effect
on domestic productivity levels. Usually studies find that trade patterns and
especially trade volumes are important in accounting for technology diffusion.
There is evidence that this is true not only in developed countries but also for
North-South trade, making developing countries benefit from foreign stock of
knowledge. However, spillovers are usually found to be smaller for developing
than for developed countries. This can be attributed to the more favorable local
conditions in developed countries, which usually have better institutions and
infrastructure and higher levels of human capital. These factors are found to be
important as well for rising the absorptive capacity of developing countries (see
Seck, 2012).
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6 Conclusion
In this survey we investigated theoretical models and empirical evidence for the
role of technological upgrading and technology diffusion for economic growth,
as well as the channels through which technology spillovers can occur. Endoge-
nous growth models make clear that technological upgrading is an important
mechanism for sustaining long-run growth, which is especially important for the
catch-up process of developing countries. Given the empirical evidence that the
biggest part of R&D aimed at the creation of new technologies takes place in a
small number of industrialized countries and that foreign technologies account
for the largest share of the technologies that are used in many, especially small
and relatively poor countries, technology diffusion is an important means of con-
vergence between poor and rich economies. While most theoretical models on
technology and growth imply a catch-up process of technologically less advanced
countries, convergence is not achieved in all models thus impeding technologically
less advanced countries to reach the technology level of the technological leader
(see for example Wang and Blomstro¨m 1992; Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997 for
models implying convergence and Findlay 1978 for a model implying an equilib-
rium technology gap).
Some theoretical models provide explanations of how to speed up the catch-
up process of technologically less advanced countries making them able to adopt
newly available technologies more efficiently. These mechanisms include educa-
tion and training (see Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Findlay, 1978; Wang and Blom-
stro¨m, 1992; Seck, 2012), the provision of suitable infrastructure and institutions
(see Findlay, 1978; Seck, 2012) or imply the need of investment to adapt tech-
nologies developed abroad to local needs as otherwise the adoption of such tech-
nologies remains unprofitable (see Zeira, 2007). Theoretical models that include
the role of trade and FDI as transmission channels of technology diffusion suggest
that opening up economies to international markets has beneficial effects on tech-
nology transfers from technologically more advanced to less advanced economies.
This is often explained by increased interaction with individuals that have access
to foreign technologies, by the implicit access to foreign technologies embodied in
imports, by learning effects from exporting through technical assistance of cus-
tomers, or also by competition effects that make firms become more efficient and
improve their productivity, what might occur also through investment in more
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advanced technologies. Thus, trade as such does not only have the potential to
act as a means of technology diffusion but also as a means of technology creation
via increasing competition and the incentive of firms to innovate (see Wood, 1995;
Thoenig and Verdier, 2003; Melitz, 2003; Bustos, 2011).
Furthermore, we discussed problems connected to the measurement of tech-
nology and technology diffusion and mentioned some data sources on commonly
used proxies for technology. The most popular proxies include expenditure on
R&D, the use of patents, and measures of labor or total factor productivity
or some variants of them. There are studies that also proxy technology levels
by high-technology exports, or imports of computers, machinery and technical
equipment, or information on ICT capital goods.
There exist serious data constraints for some of the indicators, especially for
developing countries as data on porxies of technology do not exist for a long
period of time or are even missing for some countries altogether. Some proxies
that are usually used in industrialized countries are less suitable for developing
countries, such as domestic R&D expenditure. This has to be taken into account
in empirical studies. However, with new data becoming more readily available
over time there is hope that the situation is going to improve in the long-run thus
providing potential pathways for future research.
Empirical studies on technology diffusion in developing countries through in-
ternational trade and FDI provide a heterogeneous picture. There is no strong
evidence for the existence of positive productivity spillovers through FDI to do-
mestic firms. Usually studies that find such domestic productivity enhancing
effects rely on cross-sectional datasets and are unable to account for selection
and endogeneity problems. Research that relies on panel datasets is usually able
to take these issues into account. Their results usually suggest insignificant ef-
fects of the presence of foreign firms on the productivity of domestic companies,
or even significantly negative ones (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Waldkirch and
Ofosu, 2010). This raises the concern of whether policies that aim at increasing
FDI inflows are justified. Although foreign firms are usually more productive
than domestic firms and positive productivity spillovers to other foreign firms
seem to exist (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999), the benefits from this are likely
not to accrue to the host-country of these companies but to the MNCs that are
usually locating in other countries. However, also employment, wage and labor
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standard effects have to be taken into account when evaluating the desirability
of FDI in an economy.
The validity of imports as a channel of technology diffusion is confirmed by
many studies, pointing towards a positive impact of the foreign R&D stock on
domestic productivity. Although based on the study by Keller (1998) the im-
pression emerged that trade does not act as a transfer channel of technologies,
this result was attenuated by Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005) who demonstrated that
indirect technology spillovers via third countries have to be accounted for. Their
result emphasized the role of trade openness as they found that trade volumes
rather than the composition of trade matters for technology diffusion. Coe et
al.’s (1997) results suggest that positive spillovers of foreign R&D via trade also
exist in developing countries, a result which is confirmed by Conte and Vivarelli
(2011) who base their estimations on a different empirical setup.
The summarized literature reveals that policies aimed at enhancing technology
diffusion should not be conducted in isolation but should be backed-up with
accompanying measures that aim to provide the human capital that is needed
in order to make use of newly available technologies through education, training
programs and technical support. Also necessary infrastructure and institutions
have to be provided in order for technology diffusion to materialize. Policies that
prevent investment climate constraints to domestic firms, which might not have
the same capacity as foreign firms to influence their own investment climate,
are likely to have a positive impact on domestic firms’ productivity (see Kinda,
2012). Additionally, active screening for new technologies, and investment in the
adaptation of foreign technologies to local needs are actions conducive for faster
technology adoption ECA (see 2014).
56
References
Acemoglu, D. (2003). Patterns of skill premia. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 199-230.
ADB (2010). Information and Communication Technology for Development: ADB Experiences.
Asian Development Bank.
ADB (2015). ADB’s Work to Improve Access to Information and Communication. Asian De-
velopment Bank. See http://www.adb.org/sectors/ict/overview.
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., and P. Howitt (2005). Competition and
innovation: an inverted-U relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 701-
728.
Aitken, B.J. and A.E. Harrison (1999). Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign invest-
ment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review, 89(3), 605-618.
Arellano, M., and O. Bover (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
Asiedu, E. (2002). On the determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries: is
Africa different? World Development, 30(1), 107-119.
Barro, R., and J. Lee (1993). International comparisons of educational attainment. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 32, 363-394.
Barro, R., and J.W. Lee (2000). International data on education: an overview. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, special issue, 607-629.
Barro, R.J., and X. Sala-I-Martin (1997). Technological diffusion, convergence, and growth.
Journal of Economic Growth, 2, 1-27.
Barro, R.J., and X. Sala-I-Martin (1995). Economic growth. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Berman, E., Bound, J., and S. Machin (1998). Implications of skill-biased technological change:
international evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1245-1279.
Blomstro¨m, M., and F. Sjo¨holm (1999). Technology transfer and spillovers: does local partici-
pation with multinational matter? European Economic Review, 43, 915-923.
Bloom, N., and J. Van Reenen (2002). Patents, real options and firm performance. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 112(478), C97-C116.
Blundell, R., and S. Bond (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel-
data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
Bustos, P. (2011) Trade liberalization, exports, and technology upgrading: evidence on the
impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian firms. American Economic Review, 101, 304-340.
Clerides, S., Lach, S., and J. Tybout (1998). Is learning by exporting important? Microdynamic
Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 903-
948.
Coe, D.T, and E. Helpman (1995). International R&D spillovers. European Economic Review,
39, 859-887.
57
Coe, D.T, Helpman, E., and A.W. Hoffmaister (1997). North-south R&D spillovers. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 107. 134-149.
Conte, A., and M. Vivarelli (2011). Imported skill-biased technological change in developing
countries. The Developing Economies, 49(1), 36-65.
DACST (1996). White Paper on Science and Technology: Preparing for the 21st Century.
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Pretoria.
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S., and P.A. Samuelson (1977). Comparative advantage, trade, and
payments in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods. American Economic Review, 67,
823-839.
DST (2002). South Africa’s National Research and Development Strategy. Department of Sci-
ence and Technology, Pretoria.
Eaton, J., and S. Kortum (2002). Technology, geography, and trade. Econometrica, 70(5),
1741-1779.
ECA (2013). National experiences in the transfer of publicly funded technologies in Africa:
Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. ECA Publish-
ing and Distribution Unit (PDU).
ECA (2014). Using national inventor’s associations to accelerate the adoption of technology
and innovation in Africa. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. NTIS/005/2014,
1-4.
ECA (2015). About Innovation & Technology. United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Africa. See http://www.uneca.org/our-work/innovation-technology-0/pages/
about-innovation-technology.
European Patent Office (2013). EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT).
Available from http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-24.
html.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2013). Annual progress report for F.Y. 2011/12:
Growth and Transformation Plan. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.
Feenstra, R.C. and G.H. Hanson (1999). The impact of outsourcing and high-technology capital
on wages: estimates from the United States, 1979-1990. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114,
907-940.
Feenstra R.C., Inklaar, R., and M.P. Timmer (2013). The Next Generation of the Penn World
Table. Available from www.ggdc.net/pwt.
Findlay, R. (1978). Relative backwardness, direct foreign investment, and the transfer of tech-
nology: a simple dynamic model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XCII(1), 1-16.
Fosfuri, A., Motta M., and T. Ronde (2001). Foreign direct investment and spillovers through
workers’ mobility. Journal of International Economics, 53, 205-222.
Government of Bangladesh (2012). Perspective Plan of Bangladesh 2010-2021: making Vision
2021 a reality. General Economics Division Planning Commission, Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
58
Government of Ghana (1995). Ghana’s Vision 2020: The Co-ordinated Programme of Economic
and Social Development Policies. NDPC, Accra, Ghana.
Government of Madagascar (2006). Madagascar Action Plan (MAP): 2007-2012: a bold and
exciting plan for rapid development. Government of Madagascar, Antananarivo, Madagascar.
Go¨rg, H., and E. Strobl (2001) Multinational companies and productivity spillovers: a meta-
analysis. The Economic Journal, 111, F723-F739.
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman (1990). Trade, innovation, and growth. The American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association, 80(2), 86-91.
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman (1991). Innovation and growth in the global economy. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Haddad, M., and A. Harrison (1993). Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign invest-
ment? Evidence from panel data for Morocco. Journal of Development Economics, 42, 51-74.
Harrigan, F. (2007). Technology and Development in Asia. ERD Policy Brief Series, No 49,
1-13.
Hashmi, A.R. (2013). Competition and innovation: the inverted-U relationship revisited. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), 1653-1668.
Haskel, J.E., Pereira, S.C., and M.J. Slaughter (2007). Does inward foreign direct investment
boost the productivity of domestic firms? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3),
482-496.
Haskel, J.E. and M.J. Slaughter (2002). Does the sector bias of skill-biased technical change
explain changing skill premia? European Economic Review, 46, 1757-1783.
Helpman, E. (1992). Endogenous macroeconomic growth theory. European Economic Review,
36, 237-267.
Howitt, P. (2000). Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences. The American
Economic Review, 90(4), 829-846.
IDB (2015). Competitiveness, Technology and Innovation. Inter-American Development Bank.
See http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/competitiveness-technology-and-innovation/
competitivenesstechnology-and-innovation,1366.html and http://www.iadb.org/
en/topics/competitiveness-technology-and-innovation/cti-objectives,6567.
html.
Katayama, H., Shihua, L., and J. Tybout (2009). Firm-level productivity studies: illusions and
a solution. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 403-413.
Keller, W. (1998). Are international R&D spillovers trade related? Analyzing spillovers among
randomly matched trade partners. European Economic Review, 42, 1469-1481.
Keller, W. (2004). International Technology Diffusion. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(3),
752-782.
59
Kinda, T. (2012). Foreign ownership, sales to multinationals and firm efficiency: the case of
Brazil, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa and Vietnam. Applied Economics Letters 19, 551-
555.
Kokko, A., Tansini, R., and M.C. Zejan (1996). Local technological capability and productivity
spillovers from FDI in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector. Journal of Development Studies,
32, 602-611.
Kumar, S., and R.R. Russel (2002). Technological change, technological catch-up, and capi-
tal deepening: relative contributions to growth and convergence. The American Economic
Review, 92(3), 527-548.
Levinsohn, J., and A. Petrin (2003). Estimating production function using inputs to control for
unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 317-342.
Lichtenberg, F.R., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. European Economic Review, 42,
1483-1491.
Liu, Z. (2008). Foreign direct investment and technology spillovers. Journal of Development
Economics, 85(1-2), 176-193.
Lucas, R.E., Jr. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 22(1), 3-42.
Lumenga-Neso, O, Olarreaga, M., and M. Schiff (2005). On ‘indirect’ trade-related R&D
spillovers. European Economic Review, 49, 1785-1798.
Mankiew, N.G., Romer, D., and D.N. Weil (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407-37.
Mansfield, E.M. (1961). Technical change and the rate of imitation. Econometrica, XXIX, 741-
766.
Mansfield, E.M., and A. Romeo (1980). Technology transfer to overseas subsidiaries by U.S.-
based firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95(4), 737-750.
Melitz, M.J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725.
Nelson, R.R., and E.S. Phelps (1966). Investment in humans, technological diffusion, and eco-
nomic growth. The American Economic Review, 56(1/2), 69-75.
Nelson, R.R. (1968). A diffusion model of international productivity differences. The American
Economic Review, LVIII, 1219-1248.
NDPC (2010). Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA): costing framework
(2010-2013). National Development Planning Commission, Accra, Ghana.
OECD (2002). Frascati manual: proposed standard practice for surveys on research and exper-
imental development. OECD Publication Service, Paris, France.
OECD (2014a). Research and Development Statistics (RDS). Available from http://data.
oecd.org/.
60
OECD (2014b). Science Technology and Industry Outlook 2014. Available from http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB#.
OECD (2015a). Main Science and Technology Indicators. Available from http://stats.oecd.
org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB#
OECD (2015b). OECD patent databases. Available from http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/
oecdpatentdatabases.htm.
Park, W. (2008). International patent protection: 1960-2005. Research Policy, 37(4), 761-766.
Quah, D.T. (1997). Empirics for growth and distribution: stratification, polarization, and con-
vergence clubs. Journal of Economic Growth, 2(1), 27-59.
Rivera-Batiz, L., and P. Romer (1991). Economic integration and endogenous growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 106(2), 531-555.
Rodriguez-Clare´, A. (1996). Multinationals, linkages, and economic development. American
Economic Review, 86, 852-873.
Romer, P.M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy,
94(5), 1002-1037.
Romer, P.M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5),
71-102.
Seck, A. (2012). Internatinal technology diffusion and economic growth: explaining the spillover
benefits to developing countries. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 23, 437-451.
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2006). The Five Year Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-
2010. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam.
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2011). Socio-Economic Development Plan for the 2011-
2015 period. See http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/strategies/
strategiesdetails\%3FcategoryId\%3D30\%26articleId\%3D10052505.
Solow, R.M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 70(1), 65-94.
Solow, R.M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 39(3), 312-320.
Tang, L, and P.E. Koveos (2008). Embodied and disembodied R&D spillovers to developed and
developing countries. International Business Review, 17, 546-558.
Thoenig, M. and T. Verdier (2003). A theory of defensive skill-biased innovation and globaliza-
tion. American Economic Review, 93(3), 709-728.
Todaro, M.P, and S. Smith (2015). Economic Development, 12th Edition. Prentice Hall. Chapter
3.
UNCTAD (2013). Science, Technology and Innovation for Development. United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development. See http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/
STI4D.aspx.
61
UNCTAD (2014). World investment report 2014. Investing in the SDGs: an action plan.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. United Nations Publication, Geneva,
Switzerland.
UNCTAD (2015). UNCTADstat. Available from http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/.
Waldkirch, A., and A. Ofosu (2010). Foreign presence, spillovers, and productivity: evidence
from Ghana. World Development, 38(8), 1114-1126.
Wang, J.Y., and M. Blomstro¨m (1992). Foreign investment and technology transfer: a simple
model. European Economic Review, 36, 137-155.
Wood, A. (1995). How trade hurt unskilled workers. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9(3), 57-80.
World Bank (2014). Information & Communication Technologies Overview. See http://www.
worldbank.org/en/topic/ict/overview#1, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ict/
overview#2, and http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ict/overview#3. Last Updated:
Oct 02, 2014
World Bank (2015). World Development Indicators 2015. Available from http://data.
worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
World Bank (2015). Enterprise Surveys. Available from http://www.enterprisesurveys.
org/.
Xu, B. (2000) Multinational enterprises, technology diffusion, and host country productivity
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 477-493.
Yeaple, S.R. (2005). A simple model of firm heterogeneity, international trade, and wages.
Journal of International Economics, 65(1), 1-20.
Zeira, J. (2007). Wage inequality, technology, and trade. Journal of Economic Theory, 137,
79-103.
62
7 Appendix
Figure 17: Growth rate of charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts
(% of GDP)
(1.475192,6676.873]
(.4186078,1.475192]
(-.0214057,.4186078]
(-.5187098,-.0214057]
[-.9709501,-.5187098]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2006 and 2011.
Figure 18: Growth rate of trademark applications, total
(.5308151,5.8]
(.1609798,.5308151]
(-.2183621,.1609798]
(-.4703,-.2183621]
[-.7084701,-.4703]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2000 and 2010.
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Figure 19: Growth rate of high technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
(1.457502,1810.902]
(.1478686,1.457502]
(-.2455773,.1478686]
(-.4942727,-.2455773]
[-1,-.4942727]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2000 and 2010.
Figure 20: Growth rate of scientific and technical journal articles
(1.111111,31]
(.6744686,1.111111]
(.2565089,.6744686]
(-.2,.2565089]
[-1,-.2]
No data
Source: World Development Indicators, 2015. Growth rate between 2000 and 2010.
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